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increased requirement for military leaders to be able to understand and win wars that are fought in the will of a population more than on the field of mounted warfare. Today's simulations and simulation training environments are insufficient to prepare these leaders for such a complex fight because they do not adequately model the human dimensions of modern warfare. It is imperative that the military improve conventional simulations to credibly model complex human behaviors. This paper investigates the current simulation training environment, and then proposes a specific architecture for improving conventional simulation environments to better reflect the complexity and rich cultural fidelity of the live operational environment. The Department of Defense can significantly enhance the portrayal of adversaries and "target populations" in its training simulations by using live human input harvested from a commercial-type online gaming environment. Increasing the quality of adversaries and simulated populations will create extremely challenging simulation training environments for military leaders and will prepare them for the difficulty of live operations.
A NEW ARCHITECTURE FOR IMPROVED HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN MILITARY SIMULATIONS
In reviewing the whole array of factors a general must weigh before making his decision, we must remember that he can gauge the direction and value of the most important ones only by considering numerous other possibilities -some immediate, some remote. He must guess, so to speak; guess whether the first shock of battle will steel the enemy's resolve and stiffen his resistance, or whether, like a Bologna flask, it will shatter as soon as its surface is scratched; guess the extent of debilitation and paralysis that the drying up of particular sources of supply and the severing of certain lines of communication will cause in the enemy; guess whether the burning pain of the injury he has been dealt will make the enemy collapse with exhaustion or, like a wounded bull, arouse his rage; guess whether the other powers will be frightened or indignant, and whether and which political alliances will be dissolved or formed. When we realize that he must hit upon all this and much more by means of his discreet judgment, as a marksman hits a target, we must admit that such an accomplishment of the human mind is no small achievement. Thousands of wrong turns running in all directions tempt his perception; and if the range, confusion, and complexity of the issues are not enough to overwhelm him, the dangers and responsibilities may.
-Carl Von Clausewitz
The Need for a Change
Preparing commanders and leaders to understand, anticipate, and train for operations opposing a thinking, flexible, and committed opponent is extremely difficult.
Yet, it is vitally important for the welfare of our military forces in both the current and future conflicts. Clausewitz's comments above reflect upon the difficulty that confronts our commanders as they struggle to understand (or "guess") the intentions of the enemy and how he will react to events on the battlefield. One need look no further back than
2003 to see that the generals of this era struggle to understand the enemy and his culture just as the generals of Clausewitz's time. LTG William S. Wallace, V Corps
Commander, was clearly experiencing some of these challenges when he made his oftquoted remarks about the enemy forces V Corps faced in the opening days of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
The enemy we're fighting is a bit different than the one we war-gamed against, because of these paramilitary forces. We knew they were here, but we did not know how they would fight. ... I'm appalled by the inhumanity of the Sadaamists --Baath Party militia or officials --have shown ... giving out weapons and forcing people to fight and threatening their families. It's very disturbing to understand that someone could be that brutal. 2 American and Coalition forces were winning the tactical battles in their march toward Baghdad, but the leaders of those forces did not understand or anticipate their enemy or his actions --in spite of a series of war games designed to give them that understanding.
The Department of Defense (DoD) has relied extensively upon modeling, simulations, and war-gaming to prepare for combat for the past thirty years. DoD models and simulations, fed by exponential hardware improvements in computing power, graphic representation, memory, and storage, have become an important component of preparation for combat from the tactical through operational levels of warfare. Six years into the struggle for a stable Iraq and Afghanistan, DoD forces rely heavily on the use of simulations to prepare for troop rotations. These simulations range from individual level weapons practice to corps level certification exercises. Yet for all of the money, time, and effort poured into simulation-based training it is not difficult to discern that these simulations provide very little benefit in preparing commanders for the degree of complexity involved in the real world of multi-factional Iraq or multi-ethnic
Afghanistan. This gap in capability is recognized in the current working draft of the Army Perhaps this is the bigger challenge, not just building a complex environment, but building a complex, thinking, responsive suite of simulated adversaries and actors who each respond in ways that are similar to the real people they represent.
In order to understand this environment, we must understand the identity of our opponents and the identity of the local populace. It is not sufficient to model "an Iraqi," rather, we must be able to model the responses and attitudes of a moderate, middleaged Iraqi Shiite whose life story has been one of survival and repression and now feels the power of a chance to rule but still the anger against those who would destroy or those who would corrupt. That man, defined by his identity, does not fit within the parameters of an agent-based model, and he cannot be effectively represented by an American role player who does not understand that identity. 12 
Human Behaviors
The difficult part of modeling asymmetric environments is that the decisions are made by humans within a different set of defining rules and guidelines than those which describe conventional military maneuvers. Rather than considering the tactical or operational benefits to be gained by moving or striking at a particular piece of ground through some form of deliberate analysis (such as an analysis of Mission, Enemy, Troops, Terrain, and Time, or METT-T), 13 actors in the messy worlds described above tend to operate by a much wider set of methods to achieve much more loosely defined objectives.
In The National Simulation Center (NSC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has recognized this shortfall and begun a program to add asymmetric events to kinetic simulations. 15 The Joint Nonkinetic Effects Model (JNEM) provides training units with effects of their actions based on levels of satisfaction for population groups. As relayed by the NSC Commander, one of the most significant challenges was obtaining subject matter expertise. JNEM is based on the opinions of subject matter experts (SMEs) In both the case of JNEM and SEAS, the proponents of these products will point to their level of SME qualification as basis for the strength of the model, but this is a dangerous path to follow, for it ignores the most subjective portion of the process, incorporating the input into a programmed rule-set or algorithm to produce an output.
The best SME cannot validate any model if his role is to provide input for an interaction.
Rather, the only way to make sure that an SME provides true value is for the interaction to occur inside his head, and for the SME to provide the output! For example, if military A does action X, then our SMEs might appropriately state that this action will irritate populace B a little but greatly offend populace C. In a simulation such as JNEM or SEAS, however, this SME input is encoded as slightly lowered satisfaction values for populace B and greatly lowered satisfaction values for populace C. Responses are generated by the simulation based on a set of rules that govern interactions between populace B and C, and based on a set of satisfaction thresholds for each populace.
These calculations are based on the computer programmers' understanding of the relationships, and are thus ultimately limited by the subtlety of mathematical algorithm selected. At the development level, this subjective process can have the effect of producing either extreme swings in output (unwarranted by actual events) or, more likely, of a dampened set of outputs that follow predictable rules and inputs. This is a natural tendency among simulation developers to dampen the outputs so as to create a bell curve set of responses. The result of this process is that even the most elegant coding, based on perhaps the most brilliant SME input, can still produce simulation output that is unrealistic or that is too predictable to be much of a challenge to the military training audience.
The art of producing credible opposition has stymied the science of computerbased simulations due to imperfect understanding of how humans think, decide, and interact. In spite of the many advances in artificial intelligence (AI), fuzzy logic, and complex adaptive systems described above, the Army G3's bleak assessment of the state of M&S 19 still rings true. While understanding the reasons for this lack of progress may be enlightening, it ultimately doesn't solve the problem of developing truly challenging adversaries and multicultural populations to enhance military training events. For this, the solutions will require a different architecture.
The inventor of the Palm Pilot®, Mr. Jeff Hawkins, has written an excellent book which describes some of the difficulties that have hampered the ability of computer scientists to produce truly intelligent machines which function as well as human beings.
AI scientists tried to program computers to act like humans without first answering what intelligence is and what it means to understand. They left out the most important part of building intelligent machines, the intelligence! "Real intelligence" makes the point that before we attempt to build intelligent machines, we have to first understand how the brain works....the biggest mistake is the belief that intelligence is defined by intelligent behavior....The brain uses vast amounts of memory to create a model of the world. Everything you know and have learned is stored in this model. The brain uses this memory-based model to make continuous prediction of future events. It is the ability to make predictions about the future that is the crux of intelligence.
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As Hawkins described, many AI scientists have attempted to create artificially intelligent simulations objects using either a series of rule-based algorithms and learning systems (classic artificial intelligence methods) or a complex, belief-desire-intention environment consisting of multiple software "agents" which each have an amount of local knowledge, goals, and desires and the freedom to operate within the environment to create the appearance of a complex, self-organizing system or group. These two simulation methods have each proven successful within limited and constrained
environments, but neither has demonstrated the sophistication to respond blow-for-blow in a believable manner on a complex, asynchronous battlefield.
The sad truth is that while the display booths at a military simulations conference will look so real one can imagine "being there," our current models and simulations are inadequate for the current set of problems. We simply cannot provide a rich, complex training environment such as those that our soldiers face in Iraq and Afghanistan without humans to do the thinking. Our computers are wonderful at doing the math required to calculate movements, fires, and kinetic events, but we need humans to do the real thinking. can no longer follow a set of rules and timing in order to accurately portray the threat.
Simply having humans "play" the OPFOR and generate responses isn't enough. The "real" OPFOR, and more importantly, the target population (whose will we have to influence), have to be portrayed by the "right" humans --people with the understanding and sophistication to respond with the depth of complexity that will confront the military forces in the real world.
Before proceeding to discuss some possible solutions, it is appropriate here to recognize that not all Americans, retired military or not, are the "wrong" people to portray opposing forces and local populations in ways which will stress the ability of current commanders and staffs to function effectively in a simulation environment.
Perhaps one of the most famous examples is that of LtGen (Retired) Paul Van Riper, the OPFOR Commander for Joint Forces Command's futuristic simulation Millennium
Challenge '02 (MC02). LtGen Van Riper pushed against conventional wisdom and restrictions throughout MC02, launching small boats with high explosives to sink the U.S. Navy fleet, using motorcycle couriers for communications, and largely frustrating the efforts of the blue force commanders before being reined in by his active duty employers. 23 LtGen Van Riper's subsequent resignation from the exercise and leaked private email explaining his desire not to be associated with the results of an exercise where his initiative was constrained were widely reported in the press, much to the chagrin of the active duty leadership responsible for the exercise. The essence of this proposal is to build an online game for humans of every race, religion, culture, and age to play which stimulates and provokes them to respond to a wide variety of potential actions. Their responses are then stored and form the basis for both an immediate response to a proposed action and, more importantly, for a robust, type-specified database of "consistent" actions for specific groups, individuals, and situations. All current, ongoing, potential, and future decisions, policies, and activities in a region will be thrown into the paths of the game players in order to measure their responses and to categorize them by the things that remain relatively static: the players' identity, culture, organizational goals, and relationships.
After obtaining tens of thousands of responses, the online portion of the game will yield a treasure trove of valuable data from which to build understanding within the military and within the modeling and simulation community of how humans think, make decisions, and are driven by events in their worlds; categorized by a wide variety of cultural identifiers. Unlocking the secrets of this database will be an incredible challenge, but the potential to gain truly deep, core-level understanding of a people or an adversary or a culture is enticing. At face value, the military will have the ability to recreate valid responses to certain events, decisions, or policies. After analysis and careful validation, however, these database entries of real human responses should yield tremendous insight into the ways that human beings interact and change. The rich depth of the database will increase cultural learning in a new way for military simulations. Rather than following the previous rubric of SME-described inputs and interactions, researchers now will be able to go straight to human generated output for thousands of situations (input) and seek out credible pathways through the known cultural and cognitive processes that comprise the interactions. Not only will the military training audience receive credible output and decisions in response to their actions, they will also gain understanding of the pathways through each cultural forest.
Some Details
Based on an immersive, three-dimensional environment (such as the America's Army game), game players will be registered by origin, age, beliefs, and identity before "graduating" to the interactive portion of the game. Game players, as described in this section of the paper, are not the primary military training audience, but civilian participants willing to play online for the joy of playing. Just as America's Army® and other online communities develop huge followings of players who devote hours of time for no ulterior benefit other than having fun, this game will be able to attract a wide range of participants without cost simply by offering the game online and free of charge.
Players will identify goals, loyalty to organizations, and depth of identification through a series of intensity meters which they are able to exercise direct (but limited) control as well as indirect control based on their responses and actions for selected cues. En route to every objective, the team will encounter at least one event which is directly tied to a potential decision or action by the ultimate training audience, U.S.
military commanders. Player responses will be categorized for all media. For example, a player may be walking down the street with his partner when his partner is stopped and searched. During the search, the partner may be placed in the prone position and handcuffed for a brief time. As this occurs in the game, the game player's alter ego is still able to communicate with his partner by talking, typing, or gesturing. All of these communications are recorded and are linked to the event, the players' next set of actions, and the relationship with his partner. Linking actions and responses for the remainder of this session will provide a path down which one could send a simulation signal in the future after a similar set of circumstances and a roll of the dice.
After reaching the objective together, the team has an opportunity to debrief, after which they are disconnected and repaired with another partner for the next phase of the game. During the debrief portion of the game, players will have the ability to do some re-fit activities to become "fully ready" for the next mission. It is during this portion of the game that players will reveal their thoughts about their partner, their organization, and their goals, both immediate and long term.
The beauty of this approach is that one need not be heavy-handed to capture truly rich data. For example, suppose after each session that the game offers a player the ability to adjust his self-described level of confidence in the honesty of his partner and of a number of different groups such as Shiite, Sunni, Kurd, PKK, Turk, Syrian, Iraqi, American, Muslim, Christian, Mullah, Imam, Soldier, Man, Woman, and Politician.
Suppose that after this session, one where he only interacted with his partner, that the player changes his confidence level for Kurds to zero. If he makes no other changes on this screen before proceeding then we know at least two things about this player (and perhaps something about his partner). First, we know that the player no longer trusted his partner by the end of the recent mission. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, we know that our player chose to identify his partner by tribal affiliation rather than by religion, nationality, or sex. This simplistic example is intended to give the reader an understanding of how much we can learn from a cooperative player by stimulating him, allowing the freedom to engage, and then having the means to record the engagement.
At every stage of the game it will be important to include the live, unscripted events and responses just as much as the recognizable game events. Ideally, the game could capture the text chat and live audio throughout the game, but especially in the time immediately before and after a stimulus event. Capturing this data is much more important than capturing the specific physical response of a player body inside the simulation.
Some player "missions" will be combat, some will be intelligence collection, and some will be "clandestine" missions which will not be evident to an observer that the team is even engaged in a mission. In order to create the sense of community it is important that players be able to see and be seen in a large public setting such as a town or village. Harkening back to the strategic purpose of this game (teaching military officers how to think about what is required to win a war among the people and how to influence their will to change), it is important for the game environment not to resemble the vacant streets or sparsely populated areas of some virtual simulations. This game must be among the people, rich with the effect of thousands upon thousands of unscripted actors seeking to accomplish unrelated missions. The majority of these missions will be very simple: for example, go to the store and buy bread. The event along the way to the store may trigger some intense reactions (such as my previous example of the handcuffs) or it may not invoke so much as a passing glance (the bells of a different religion sounding at the wrong time, for example).
From a computer science perspective, one of the elegant features of the game is that each mission will provide a detailed source of data without requiring excessive computational power because the recorded actions are only those of each player as he traverses the world. This data is locally stored for transfer during the debrief, or the points-calculation phase, and thus bandwidth and computation power are dedicated to presenting an appropriately detailed world view. Each player has the ability to interact with any other within his personal area. Just as I could talk to a passerby on a New York sidewalk coming toward me but only watch a pedestrian on the other side of the street, so too will players have a scaled ability to interact and to observe based on rough rules of physics to be represented in the game. This rough area of interest management will conserve CPU cycles and keep the game progressing in real time for all players.
The game should be developed and used throughout the world in order to develop a rich mixture of culturally diverse game players. Initial implementation could start with contract SMEs or perhaps target country expatriates, but in order to achieve the maximum benefit the military should allow for unrestricted access worldwide. The target player audience is an online force of players who are experts at thinking like themselves --regional experts by birth and experience rather than by study and contract.
Advantages and Disadvantages
The advantage of this architecture proposal is that it provides the military with a sufficiently complex and demanding training environment that will result in rapid growth in understanding and sophistication of its leaders. This capability puts the onus for learning and understanding squarely upon the training audience instead of the training vehicle. The entire focus of commander and staff training will shift from results to learning, from forces destroyed to knowledge gained. Depth of understanding about cultural issues and methods of influencing humans on both personal and institutional levels will expand tremendously throughout DoD and its interagency and coalition partners. The live portion of the game will serve as a nimble foe during specific exercises, changing the way commanders and staffs approach training forever. The archived database of human responses will serve to inform simulation development, training fidelity, and cultural appreciation for years. This proposal, if widely implemented, could change how the Army trains for the next century. Military leaders and higher level commanders must clearly describe the intentional discomfort that this type of training environment will produce. Understanding the purposeful nature of the discomfort will greatly reduce the natural unwillingness to change among some senior leaders. This approach to training will yield a chance for those leaders to make the "progress from hard work" that Wass de Czege describes.
Finally, the risk of this proposed architecture (specifically, the online game portion) turning into a public relations nightmare is very real unless the military is transparent in its implementation and steadfast in its determination. There is some risk of this initiative being perceived as an intrusive, "Big Brother" activity. The program developers must adopt an attitude of transparency, stating often and publicly that the goals of this game are to help military forces build better relationships with civilians, understand local customs, and provide secure, stable environments for people of all cultures. Concurrent with this attitude of transparency will certainly be a thorough legal review and set of waiver forms that participants will be required to accept before playing the game. There is certainly precedent for this in the commercial sector, but as a government game, it will be especially important for DoD to protect itself with individual waivers for data collection and use. The stated goals of such an architecture clearly pass "The Washington Post test." 29 Those goals are: 1) developing an improved capability to train our leaders to function in complex domains, 2) educating military officers in the cultural implications of military activities, and 3) promoting better understanding of the human dimension of leadership and good governing throughout the world. These are all noble goals, and worthy of public discourse. The military need not hide the fact that it is concerned with gaining a better understanding of people from all cultures and educating its leaders. If an architecture such as the one described here is implemented, it will be important for the military to stay "on message" and remain transparent, or it risks failure for strategic communication in spite of the actual program benefits. 30 
Conclusion
Warfare in the modern age and the foreseeable future has become a complex, asymmetric struggle for the will of a populace. This type of warfare is being defined as it happens, and the leaders charged with winning the war must learn entirely new ways to defeat entirely new adversaries. Understanding joint fires or combined arms maneuver will no longer be sufficient for leaders in the modern age. In a time when the United
States is engaged in a worldwide struggle to defeat a method (the Global War on Terror), it is not an exaggeration to state that we must have leaders with a mastery of human cognition and behavior, not just a mastery of physics. Tactical prowess will be insufficient for the tasks which await current and future military commanders. These commanders must understand how to win conflicts of the mind just as their predecessors had to understand how to win conflicts of the ground.
In order to prepare its leaders to succeed in this complex environment, the military must develop an improved capability to train its leaders to think and win wars. The scope of this task demands that the military greatly improve its training. Specifically, the quality and complexity of adversaries and populations in training environments must be improved to closely match the challenges of operational environments. In simulation environments, the weakest component is the simulation's ability to create worthy opponents or credible populations. Conventional simulations for military leaders must be modified to encompass modeling complex human behaviors. The specific architecture for modifying simulations discussed in this paper is not without risk, but the risk inherent in implementing this architecture pales in comparison to the alternative of failing to develop adequately complex training environments for military leaders of the future.
Whether one chooses to accept this particular new architecture or not, the challenge to provide rich, complex human behavior representation remains unanswered. America demands that we prepare her sons and daughters for the trials which await them. The problem demands a solution, and that solution demands the incorporation of rich human dimension feedback and results in military training environments. Until the U.S. military can directly tie specific actions, decisions, maneuvers, and policies to the strategic objectives of a conflict, it is not likely to succeed. If strategic success relies upon a nation's ability to influence the will of a people to modify behaviors, then developing appropriate tools to train military leaders to accomplish this objective is not a matter of convenience; it is a matter of strategic compulsion.
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